|Statement||by Bent E. Srensen and Oved Yosha.|
|Series||Temi di discussione -- no.327|
|The Physical Object|
|Number of Pages||44|
International Risk Sharing and European Monetary Unification Author(s): Leonardo Leiderman Editor(s): Mario Bléjer, David Cheney, Jacob Frenkel, and Assaf Razin Published Date: June Cited By; Related DocumentsAuthor: Leonardo Leiderman. We explore income and consumption smoothing patterns among European Community (EC) countries and among OECD countries during the period – We find that, for OECD as well as for EC countries, about 40 percent of shocks to GDP are smoothed at the one year frequency, with about half the smoothing achieved through national government budget Cited by: International Risk Sharing and European Monetary. International risk sharing and European monetary unification. Bent Sorensen and Oved Yosha. Journal of International Economics, , vol. 45, issue 2, Date: References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc Citations: View citations in EconPapers () Track citations by RSS feed. Downloads.
No. - International Risk Sharing and European Monetary Unification pdf MB Data pubblicazione: 25 March navigation you are here: Home Publications Working Papers (Temi di discussione) No. - International Risk Sharing and European Monetary Unification. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is an umbrella term for the group of policies aimed at converging the economies of member states of the European Union at three stages. The policies cover the 19 eurozone states, as well as non-euro European Union states.. Each stage of the EMU consists of progressively closer economic integration. Only once a state participates in . Journal of International Economics 45 () – International risk sharing and European monetary uniﬁcation Bent E. Sørensen, Oved Yoshaab,* a Economics Department,Brown University,Providence,RI ,USA bBerglas School of Economics,Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv ,Israel. Downloadable (with restrictions)! The paper explores the case for monetary and fiscal unification. Monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias because the monetary authorities are not able to commit. With international risk-sharing in a fiscal union, fiscal discipline suffers from moral hazard. An inflation target alleviates the inflation bias but weakens fiscal discipline.
Additional Physical Format: Online version: Sørensen, Bent E. International risk sharing and European monetary unification. [Roma]: Banca d'Italia, International risk sharing and European monetary unification. Journal of International Economics, vol. 45(2), pp. – Dombret A. () European Financial Integration: Monetary Union, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union. In: Francioni R., Schwartz R. (eds) Equity Markets in Transition. Book. Jan ; Jörg Decressin; International Risk Sharing and European Monetary Unification. Article. Feb ; Where monetary unification is not . In a monetary union, risk-sharing is particularly important because monetary policy is unable to address asymmetric, country-specific shocks, whereby some countries are in a recession while others may be booming. “International risk sharing and European monetary unification”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 45, pp.